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Political competition, relative deprivation, and perceived threat: a research note on anti-
Christian violence in India 
Chad Bauman & Tamara G.J. Leech 
Abstract 
A preliminary subnational statistical analysis of violence against Christians in contemporary 
India, this article suggests that whereas the data provide very little support for simple, 
demographic explanations of this violence, they do more robustly support theories emphasizing 
the relative status of ethnic and religious minorities (vis-à-vis majorities) and the perception, 
among Hindus, that Christians (and other minorities) represent a threat to their numerical, 
political and economic strength. 
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Political competition, relative deprivation, and perceived threat: a research note on anti-
Christian violence in India 
Introduction 
While Hindu–Muslim violence has been extensively analysed, Hindu–Christian violence was 
until recently so rare that scholars have seldom investigated the phenomenon. In the last decade, 
however, violence between Hindu and Christian groups in India has increased substantially. 
Christians are now attacked, on average, over 200 times a year, although the scope and severity 
of those attacks varies widely. In this research note we provide a descriptive analysis of violence 
against Christians, with the intention of encouraging and guiding future research. Our analysis 
raises as many questions as it answers. But that, essentially, is the point. 
 
We begin with an investigation of population dynamics that could contribute to higher levels of 
violence. Subsequently, we analyse indicators specific to ethnicity and socioeconomic status 
(e.g. the size and growth of religious, caste and tribal groups). Next, we move on to explore 
indicators of political power and competition between Hindu nationalists and other political 
bodies. Finally, we end with an examination of indicators of human capital and relative 
deprivation among the Hindu population. As we note in our concluding remarks, our data 
provide some minimal support for simple (e.g. demographic), macro-level explanations, 
particularly with regard to regions like the relatively less-developed north. However, the data 
also suggest that such explanations are unsustainable at the national level, where only theories 
focused on the relative status of ethnic minorities (vis-à-vis dominant groups) and on perceived 
threat receive consistent support. 
Context and background 
Thugs, criminals and opportunists surely factor into anti-minority violence in India (Brass 2003; 
Pandey 2006), but various Hindu nationalist organizations’ direct and indirect support of 
violence against Christians is also widely acknowledged (Sarkar 1999; Aaron 2002; Hardiman 
2002; Brass 2003). These organizations are known collectively as the Sangh Parivar, which 
includes a number of social, religious and cultural organizations as well as India's most powerful 
opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party, BJP). All of these groups 
espouse, to varying degrees, the ideology of Hindutva (‘Hindu-ness’) as the basis for national 
unity, and therefore suspect ‘foreign’ religious minorities, particularly Muslims and Christians, 
of potential disloyalty. Concerns about Christianity are exacerbated by what is perceived to be its 
aggressive proselytizing (Jaffrelot 2007). While violence against Muslims has been a relatively 
regular feature of independent India, violence against Christians has become a significant issue 
only since the late 1990s. 
 
Given Hindu nationalists’ common coupling of Islam and Christianity as ‘foreign religions’, we 
place violence against Christians into the theoretical contexts promoted in the literature on 
Hindu–Muslim violence and political violence more generally. The most significant recent 
statistical analyses of Hindu–Muslim violence, in our view, are those by Henrik Urdal (2008), 
Ashutosh Varshney (2002) and Steven Wilkinson (2004). Their work guides the present analysis 
in important ways. Our data will therefore, we hope, not only reveal something about the nature 
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of Hindu–Christian violence, but also, at least indirectly, about the extent to which their theories, 
advanced in the context of Hindu–Muslim violence, are useful in the context of Hindu–Christian 
violence. 
 
While our investigation is preliminary, it proceeds with three comparative advantages. First, 
while much of the extant work on political violence is based on comparative national statistics, 
and is therefore unable to identify, interpret or account for intra-national discrepancies, our 
research is based on state-level analyses. Second, we assess Hindu–Christian violence, a species 
of ethnic violence,1 separately from other forms of political violence (e.g. civil wars, rebellions, 
pogroms). Few studies on religious minorities make this necessary distinction in their analytic 
plan. Among other issues, incidents of ethnic violence tend to be both more transitory and more 
geographically limited than other forms of political violence (Froystad 2009). Finally, whereas 
many larger studies examine only violent regions, looking for their commonalities, our analysis 
takes into consideration how peaceful states differ from violent states. As Varshney (2002, p. 6) 
has suggested, ‘until we study ethnic peace, we will not be able to have a good theory of ethnic 
conflict.’ 
Data 
Our database contains information on 223 violent incidents in 2007 and 279 violent incidents in 
2008 (502 total incidents). ‘Violent’, as we defined it, includes: (1) any form of physical violence 
or coercion (e.g. murder, beatings, kidnapping); and (2) any act that could intentionally or 
inadvertently harm an individual or group (e.g. arson, throwing rocks through windows, etc.). 
The vast majority of the incidents recorded in the database fall into category 1. In addition, we 
included only incidents with specific information on date, location and the identity of victims. 
For example, if a report on a riot indicated, in a general way, that fifty homes had been burned 
down in a certain region (as was often the case in the reporting on riots), nothing was recorded. 
However, if, for example, the report mentioned that a pastor's house had been burned down in a 
specific village on a specific date, then the incident was recorded. Furthermore, we recorded an 
incident only once, no matter how many victims were affected. This method of recording helps 
explain why Orissa, which experienced significant Hindu–Christian rioting in late 2007 and in 
2008, was only fourth (48) in terms of total incidents in 2007–8, after Karnataka (167), Andhra 
Pradesh (61) and Madhya Pradesh (58). It also means, however, that incidents of riot violence 
have been given proportionately less weight in our statistical analysis. Finally, we focused on 
violence against Christians, and therefore did not include in our database incidents of violence or 
retaliation by Christians against Hindus, even though several such incidents did occur during this 
period. 
The literature on Hindu–Muslim violence focuses mostly on the grand spectacle of the large-
scale riot. Hindu–Christian violence has its spectacles, such as the riots in Dangs, Gujarat (1998), 
and a series of riots in the Kandhamal region of Orissa (2007–8) (Aaron 2002; Chatterji 2009; 
Bauman 2010). Although serious, particularly in the case of Kandhamal, none of the Hindu–
Christian riots have approached the worst Hindu–Muslim conflicts in severity, and Hindu–
Christian riots of this scale remain relatively rare. Because of this, Hindu–Christian violence is 
typified by the smaller, more limited incident. These incidents might be linked to or at times 
inspired by broader, more regional upheavals. But they are more regularly isolated events. 
Therefore, unlike the database developed by Varshney (2002) and Wilkinson (2004), and used 
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by Urdal (2008), which focuses on large-scale Hindu–Muslim riots, our database contains a 
record of individual incidents of violence against Christians. These incidents expand the current 
quantitative depiction of anti-minority violence to include the routine (Pandey 2006) nature of 
Hindu–Christian violence. Hindu–Christian violence is routine not only in the sense of everyday, 
but also in the sense of regularized and routinized in the treatment of Christians and in the 
framing of Christianity as a threatening minority. 
 
We opted to use media data sources because the Government of India does not publish statistics 
on violence against Christians as such. Information obtained through keyword searches of news 
sources was supplemented by that found on more systematic incident lists maintained by three 
organizations, all of them Christian: Compass Direct News (www.compassdirect.org), the Global 
Council of Indian Christians (www.persecution.in) and Christian Solidarity Worldwide 
(www.csw.org.uk). 
 
It would have been preferable, in this preliminary analysis, to pair data culled from media reports 
with government statistics, if they had existed. Although official government records on ethnic 
violence are notoriously problematic (Varshney 2002), data compiled by our method could be 
compromised as well. Pandey has argued persuasively that colonial British narrations of 
‘communal’ violence tended to perpetuate and reify the self-justifying colonial assertion that 
inter-religious conflict was endemic to pre-British India and could only be exterminated through 
strong-handed colonial rule and ‘civilizing’ efforts. Pandey (1990, p. 102) writes: ‘Even the 
“bare facts” of the situation were constructed, and constructed out of the prejudices, biases and 
“common sense” of the writers.’ Similarly, Christian media narrations of anti-Christian violence 
tend to adhere to a well-rehearsed master narrative that frames ‘persecution’ of Christians in 
rather simple terms as the unprovoked work of Hindu nationalists opposed to religious freedom 
and secular governance, and necessitating/justifying intervention not only from India's 
government, but also from foreign powers, the United Nations (UN), non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and Christians worldwide. This master narrative plasters over a variety of 
more complicated facts. 
 
It is of course also a possibility that in the service of perpetuating this master narrative, Christian 
media sources have inflated the number and severity of incidents. That said, while the details of 
the incidents recorded in these media outlets may have been stereotyped in ways just described, 
we have no reason to believe that they have been fabricated. Indeed, in our own travels in India 
we have collected reports of dozens of similar stories that were not recorded at all by the media. 
Moreover, we have no reason to believe that instances of fabrication, if they occurred, would 
favour one state over another. There is, however, a possible state-by-state bias in the fact that 
some Christian organizations might be better than others at getting violence against their 
members reported in news sources. If these denominations or missionary organizations were 
concentrated in a specific state or region, then the number of incidents could become inflated in 
that location. However, given the number of incidents recorded and the variety of 
denominations/organizations targeted in the incidents, we believe this potential bias has had at 
most a minimal effect, and so we remain confident that our data provide a relatively accurate 
picture of the state-by-state distribution of incidents. For these reasons, in the absence of data 
from the government or other sources, our data remain the most thorough and the most reliable 
currently available. 
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One further issue worth noting is that many of our demographic statistics come from the last 
Indian census, which was conducted in 2001 (Office of the Registrar General 2001).This means 
that our demographic data is six to seven years removed from the incidents of violence. The lag 
is less of a problem on some measures than others. For example, the effect of differential growth 
on ethnic violence, it has been argued, is largely about perceived relative growth, and so one 
would assume changes in growth rate would have a lagging effect (Urdal 2008). 
 
Statistics on the Christian and Hindu populations in 2001, the 1991–2001 Christian and Hindu 
decadal growth rates, and police presence data come from the Statistical Abstract India, 2004 
(Office of the Registrar General 2004). Data on population density, scheduled caste (SC) 
population, scheduled tribe (ST) population, sex ratio, age distribution, literacy, employment and 
economic indicators come from the Census of India 2001 (Office of the Registrar General 2001). 
Electoral results for the 2004 and 2009 Lok Sabha elections come from the Election Commission 
of India (www.eci.nic.in). 
Methods 
Existing literature on political violence and Hindu–Muslim violence suggests that states 
experiencing violence against Christians may have unique dynamics falling into four categories: 
(1) demographic characteristics; (2) religion, caste and tribe dynamics; (3) political power and 
competition; and (4) human capital and relative deprivation. We explore each of these topics in 
separate sections below. The analyses are meant to be descriptive, so we rely heavily upon 
bivariate comparisons and comparisons of means tests. 
 
Twelve of the thirty-five states experienced no violence against Christians between 2007 and 
2008. Those that did recorded 1–167 events. (The 167 incidents in Karnataka was an outlier, 
with the next largest prevalence being sixty-one in Andhra Pradesh.) Our analyses compare the 
characteristics of states that experienced any violence against Christians to those that 
experienced none. 
 
In recognition of potential cultural, social and economic differences by region, we analysed 
trends in specific regions – i.e. we performed subanalyses specific to states in the northeast, 
south and north. Overall, we identified few statistically significant relationships within regions, 
and the direction of relationships conformed to those presented in our results on the larger 
sample (with the exception of the north region, as presented in the ‘Demographic characteristics’ 
section). Beyond these general findings, the small number of states by region – for example, the 
south region only contains seven states and the northeast only contains eight – provides very 
little statistical power and makes us reticent to discuss any identified trends. We did, however, 
consistently make one geographic distinction that we identified as theoretically compelling and 
methodologically feasible. 
 
Due to cultural, ethnic, linguistic and religious distinctions from the rest of India, we performed 
all of our comparisons on a subsample that excludes the northeastern region of India. Seventy-
seven per cent of the remaining states (twenty out of twenty-seven) experienced an incident of 
violence against Christians. For the sake of simplicity, and in the absence of established 
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terminology, we will refer to this subsample of India excluding the northeast as ‘Peninsular 
India’. Important to our analysis, this area of India has a significantly smaller concentration of 
Christians compared to the northeast (4 per cent versus 39 per cent, respectively). 
Demographic characteristics 
It is relatively widely attested in the extant literature that impoverished countries are more 
vulnerable to internal political violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Urdal 2008). Similarly, 
resource-scarcity theorists posit that population growth and population density, combined with 
inadequate renewable natural resources, leads to competition and, in certain circumstances, 
violence between groups (e.g. Myers 1993; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998; Kahl 2006). This 
would indicate that ethnic violence is primarily an issue in low-income, urbanizing areas 
(Engineer 1984; Horowitz 2001), but the argument can be extended to rural areas. Urdal, for 
example, finds a positive association between rural population density and armed conflict, but no 
association between rural population density and Hindu–Muslim riots (Urdal 2008). Hudson and 
den Boer (2004) suggest that regions with a surplus of males (i.e. a higher sex ratio) are at 
greater risk of political violence, although Urdal (2008) does not find male surpluses to be a 
contributing factor in his analysis of Hindu–Muslim riots. Instead, youth bulges correlate 
positively with every kind of political violence in India, including Hindu–Muslim riots (2008). 
Other scholars contend that there is an inverse correlation between social control and political 
violence. According to this perspective, the more individuals or groups feel they can participate 
in violence against others without serious social or legal repercussions, the more the risk of 
violence increases. Thus, many theorists (Horowitz 1985; Kohli 1990; Tilly 2003) correlate 
‘state weakening’ with ethnic violence. 
 
Police presence is a passable index of state strength. The police in India are notoriously corrupt 
and ineffective, so much so that Brass (2003) doubts whether the addition of more or better-
trained police would lead to a decrease in Hindu–Muslim violence, and Wilkinson (2004) finds 
little support for state-weakening theories in his research on Hindu–Muslim violence. 
Nevertheless, in part because of our intuition that Hindu–Christian violence takes place primarily 
in rural areas (where police presence is generally minimal), we tested, in this analysis, for 
possible correlations of police presence and Hindu–Christian violence. 
 
In sum, the literature on the association of demographic variables and political violence might 
lead to the following hypothetical characterization of states experiencing an incident of violence 
against Christians: they are (1) poorer, (2) under-policed, (3) densely populated areas with a 
disproportionate number of (4) men and (5) young adults. Our data suggest that this is not an 
accurate depiction of areas that experience anti-Christian violence (Table 1). The presence of 
police is the only demographic characteristic that distinguishes states experiencing violence from 
others at the level of statistical significance. On average, states that do not experience violence 
against Christians have over twice the number of police per 100,000 people than states that 
experience violence. 
 
Although it is not statistically significant, it should be recognized that the sex ratio trends in the 
direction expected by Hudson. For good measure, we explored the sex ratio of the ‘youth bulge’ 
in particular. There is no evidence that states that experienced violence had a larger 
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concentration of young men. However, this represents the one area where subanalyses by region 
contradict the results for the overall sample, and differences are so large that we feel they are 
worth mentioning. As is indicated in Table 2, when comparisons are limited to the north region, 
the sex ratio and youth bulge are associated with the experience of violence against Christians. 
Compared to states not experiencing violence, these states have a higher concentration of men 
(sex ratio of 766 vs 922, respectively) as well as a larger portion of young adults (21 per cent vs 
26 per cent, respectively). 
 
These trends could be informative, but all of our information on demographic characteristics is 
measured based on information provided in the 2001 census, so our results should be interpreted 
cautiously.2 This limitation could be especially important for the information about youth bulges 
since we utilized the percentage of the population aged seven to seventeen. 
Religion, caste and tribe characteristics 
Many social theorists have argued that an important factor in ethnic conflict is the relative 
increase or decline (or perceived increase or decline) of the ethnic groups involved (Horowitz 
2001; Lake and Rothchild 2001; Toft 2002). In India, Hindu nationalists claim that Christians’ 
aggressive evangelizing and free use of money and social services to ‘lure’ marginalized groups 
within Indian society (e.g. the lower castes and tribes) to the Christian fold will contribute to the 
growth of Christianity at the expense of Hinduism, framed in this discourse as a non-
evangelizing and non-converting religion (S. Sarkar 1999, 2002; Bauman 2010). In the public 
discussion of Hindu–Muslim conflict in India, both Hindu nationalists and Muslims also assert 
that violence correlates positively with the proportion of Muslims in any given location, although 
their explanation for why this is so differs drastically (Varshney 2002). Contrary to both of these 
theoretical contentions, Wilkinson does not find a statistically significant correlation between the 
proportion of Muslims and the occurrence of Hindu–Muslim riots (Wilkinson 2004). Moreover, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that Christians are most likely to be targeted in areas where they are 
most vulnerable, that is, in areas where they do not constitute a significant proportion of the 
population. 
 
Our data indicate inconsistent associations between anti-Christian violence and basic indicators 
of the size and growth of Hindu and Christian populations, respectively. Table 3 indicates a 
significant association with characteristics of the Christian population, but only when the heavily 
Christian northeast is included in the analysis. Analyses that exclude the northeast region 
indicate significant relationships between violence and characteristics of the Hindu population. 
 
Our results are better understood if we consider differential growth rates. As Urdal (2008) notes, 
few attempts have been made to model the relationship of violence and differential growth rates. 
Toft's (2007) work on civil war is one exception. Toft finds increased risk of violence in contexts 
with a decreasing majority and a static minority, but does not find an increased risk of violence 
in societies with decreasing majorities and increasing minorities (Toft 2002). In contrast, Urdal's 
(2008) data demonstrate no significant relationship between differential growth rates and Hindu–
Muslim riots. 
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Our data are more in line with Toft's data, revealing interesting differences in differential growth 
rates between states that experience anti-Christian violence and states that do not. Figure 1 
graphically depicts the percentage of states experiencing violence when Hindu and Christian 
growth rates are considered simultaneously. The primary distinction occurs where states have a 
Hindu population that is increasing much faster (more than 5 per cent greater increase) than the 
Christian population. More than twice as many states experienced violence if they fell into the 
categories of the Christian population increasing at a similar or faster rate (±5 per cent) than the 
Hindu population. 
  
There is also reason to expect Hindu nationalists to feel threatened by Christians where there is 
growing political and numerical power of the SCs and STs (Appadurai 2006). It is commonly 
asserted by critics of Hindu nationalism that its anti-minority tendencies are fueled by a central 
core of upper-caste Hindu leaders who sense (and fear) that their traditional political, social and 
economic advantages are being eroded by India's democratic governance and affirmative action-
style system of political, vocational and educational reservations for members of what are 
officially called ‘Scheduled Castes’ (i.e. the lower castes, or dalits), and ‘Scheduled Tribes’ (i.e. 
tribal groups that have traditionally been on the margins, culturally and geographically, of Hindu 
and Indian society). Lobo (2002, p. 9), for example, argues that ‘in the context of globalization, 
Hindu nationalists are fighting a last-ditch attempt by deceit, cunning and cleverness to 
clandestinely retain the Brahminical [i.e. upper-caste] hegemony and advancement of political 
privileges, which they had been continuously enjoying for centuries.’ If these theories were 
correct, then one would expect to see violence against Christians in states with small and/or 
declining upper-caste communities, both because Christians are minorities and because so many 
of them converted from SC and ST communities. Referring back to Table 3, our results indicate 
that the SC percentage is positively correlated with anti-Christian violence, but the ST 
percentage is negatively correlated. These results are consistently significant whether the 
northeast is excluded or not. 
Political power 
The role of fear and power struggles most obviously extends to political considerations. Within 
social democracies such as India, the numerical decline of a majority portends its political 
weakening. Hindu nationalists in India have been largely unsuccessful in gaining the electoral 
support of religious minorities (Maclean 1999). Many popular and scholarly commentators, 
therefore, view the Hindu nationalist stigmatization and/or targeting of minorities as an 
instrumentalist ploy intended to consolidate the ‘Hindu’ vote (Zavos 2001). In turn, it is a widely 
espoused, ‘common sense’ assumption that violence against minorities is (and will be) higher in 
states where the BJP and/or its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) allies are in power, because 
of their alleged at least tacit support of it. 
 
Some scholars, however, argue that the relationship between political power and violence is 
more complex. According to Gupta (2007, p. 28): ‘[M]ultiple religious solitudes are perfectly 
capable of co-existing with one another so long as the power asymmetries between adherents of 
different faiths are so vast that there is no room for contest. After all, only equals fight ….’ 
Wilkinson's (2004, pp. 43–4) research on Hindu–Muslim violence provides some support for this 
expectation that political competition correlates with violence: 
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Having a close race in the previous state legislative election has a clear substantive effect: 
holding all other variables constant having a margin of 5% or less in the previous election leads 
to a predicted 0.003 riots per month, compared with 0.0009 riots in a town with wider election 
margins in the previous race. 
 
Table 4 shows that, on average, the NDA occupied about six Lok Sabha seats in states that 
experienced violence against Christians, versus less than one in the states that saw no violence.3 
Furthermore, in the most recent election before the violent incidents (2004), the NDA garnered 
over one third of the vote in areas with violence against Christians, but only one fourth of the 
vote in the remaining areas. These results indicate that violence is more prevalent in areas where 
the NDA has greater political power. 
 
We also investigated the contention that the closer parties get to parity in an election, the greater 
the violence in the run-up to the subsequent election by generating a measure of the absolute 
value of the NDA's distance from 50 per cent of the total vote. The results reveal that, on 
average, the NDA is closer to parity in the states where violent events occur (13 per cent) than in 
other states (25 per cent). It should be recognized that, although this measure is theoretically an 
absolute value, it is largely a measure of how close the NDA came to gaining 50 per cent of the 
vote. The NDA only garnered 50 per cent of the vote in one state (Arunachal Pradesh). In the 
remaining states, the NDA garnered anywhere from 0 per cent to 45.5 per cent of votes in the 
2004 election. 
 
Although there are dissenting voices (T. Sarkar 2002) and recent election results might suggest 
otherwise, many claim that the instrumental use of violence by the BJP and its nationalist allies 
works to their political advantage, that they know this, and that they for this reason continue to 
stoke anti-minority sentiment and condone (if not provoke) anti-minority violence (Brass 2003). 
Sunder Raj, Thambusamy and Samuel (2000) and Lobo (2002) point out, for example, that after 
the anti-Christian riots in Dangs, Gujarat (1998), the BJP picked up a record number of seats in 
the region. Our data do not support this contention for the whole of India. 
 
Figure 2 presents information about the change in the NDA's representation in government 
between 2004 and 2009. The NDA did not gain a seat in any of the states during this period, so 
we have broken states into those that did not lose an NDA seat (n=17), those that lost fewer than 
ten seats (n=11) and those that lost more than ten seats (n=7). The graph shows that every state 
where the NDA lost more than ten seats had experienced an incidence of violence against 
Christians in 2007–8. Fewer than half (41 per cent) of the states that maintained all of their NDA 
seats had experienced violence against Christians in the previous year. This trend of a loss of 
NDA seats in the year following a violent event does not support the contention that violence 
against Christians increases the political power of Hindu nationalists. 
Human capital and relative deprivation 
Beyond these political considerations, scholars and policy makers commonly propose that 
political violence is the consequence of low aggregate levels of human capital – i.e. accumulated 
skills and personal attributes associated with economic success in a particular social context. 
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Proponents of this perspective tend to focus on under-employment (which leads to social unrest) 
and/or lower levels of education (which, according to this theory, decreases the likelihood that a 
population will seek solutions to its grievances through legitimate political processes). Existing 
analyses of under-employment reveal associations with terrorist violence in Algeria (Kouaouci 
2004), ethnonationalist violence in Ireland (Maney 2005) and violent crime in India (Drièze and 
Khera 2000). Similarly, literacy and education correlate negatively with criminal violence 
(Drièze and Khera 2000) and domestic violence in India (Menon and Johnson 2004). Notably, 
however, Lange and Dawson (2010) find that educational levels correlate positively with ethnic 
violence in a number of national contexts. 
 
Table 5 provides information about human capital and its relationship to violence against 
Christians at the state level. These considerations seem to be particularly important in Peninsular 
India. States experiencing violence against Christians have low rates of literacy and work 
participation among Hindu men, and also have low rates of work participation among Christian 
men. In general, violence against Christians seems to be occurring in areas with less human 
capital. 
 
In addition to inter-state disparities in human capital, extant literature provides compelling 
reasons to explore intra-state disparities between Hindus and Christians on these same indices. 
Engineer (1984) argues that economic competition and rivalries are at the heart of many Hindu–
Muslim riots. One of the frequent claims of Hindu nationalists is that violence against Christians 
is a ‘natural’ response to Christian conversion activities, which are funded by western wealth and 
intended to lure impecunious and presumably easily duped members of the lower castes and 
tribes to convert (Tripathy 2008). This activity is deemed illegitimate because it leads, so the 
assertion goes, to a kind of undeserved (and foreign-funded) advance in education, wealth and 
social status (Bauman 2010). 
 
If such assertions are influencing behaviour, then we would expect to see more incidents of 
violence in states where Christians approach or outpace Hindus on economic and educational 
indicators. We investigated Christian/Hindu differentials in literacy rates (not shown) and found 
no significant association with incidents of violence against Christians. However, Figure 3 
displays results on employment differentials, and these data support the proposition that 
economic competition could be connected to Hindu–Christian violence. More than three-quarters 
of states where Christians are approaching employment parity with Hindus experienced violence 
compared to less than a third of those where Christians are more severely under-employed. 
Discussion and conclusions 
While our reported trends provide at least some support for a variety of theses about ethnic 
conflict and/or political violence, we find that they more generally call for increased exploration 
of perceived threat hypotheses. Due to great cultural and economic variation by region, more 
direct and simplistic macro-level explanations may be appropriate on a sub-national basis 
(indeed, our analyses indicate that demographic factors may be particularly important in the 
north). Nonetheless, at the national level, our most consistent findings indicate that relative 
measures of ethnic minorities’ status (e.g. parity in Hindu/Christian employment status) are more 
telling than basic measures of their status (e.g. Christian employment rate). In sum, our results 
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should encourage future, macro-level (especially demographic) researchers to pay specific 
attention to indicators of perceptions of Christian economic, social and political status rather than 
their objective share of resources. 
 
The conceptual explanation for these dynamics necessarily assumes that violence against 
Christians is condoned and promoted primarily by organizations associated with the Sangh 
Parivar and political parties associated with the NDA, and that these organizations and parties 
are animated by a fear of declining Hindu political and economic power (particularly upper-caste 
Hindu power).4 Given the fact that Hindus constitute roughly 80 per cent of the Indian 
population, there is no real, short-term threat to their numerical dominance. However, because of 
the heterogeneous and fractious nature of the ‘Hindu’ population, the large number of more 
secularist Hindus, as well as the substantial number of SC Hindus who frequently vote against 
nationalist parties and policies due to their perceived upper-caste bias, it is easy to see why the 
core nationalist constituency may consider itself a threatened minority. This is particularly true in 
the presence of real threats, such as relatively low Hindu growth rates, the presence of large SC 
communities (and therefore of smaller upper-caste communities), and signs that the Christian 
minority has become – or is in a position to become – a serious contender in the job market. In 
such a context, and when elections are close, the employment outlook pessimistic, educational 
achievement low, and social control weak, nationalist politicians and their supporters may be 
expected to resist their declining political power by instrumentalizing communal identities 
through the stigmatization of, or the explicit or implicit support for, violence against Christians 
(even though the data suggest that such instrumentalization may be counterproductive). 
 
The importance of perceived threat is evidenced in our results on the size and growth of the 
Christian and Hindu populations, political power and economic indicators. The inverse 
relationship between violence and both Christian population size and growth is inconsistent with 
the literature, but we find that differential Hindu–Christian growth is negatively related to 
violence, especially in Peninsular India. Peninsular states where Christian growth rates approach 
or exceed that of Hindus are more than twice as likely to experience violence compared to states 
where Hindu growth rates are higher. Our results, therefore, provide support for differential 
growth theories advanced by Horowitz (2001), Lake and Rothchild (2001), Toft (2007) and 
Weiner (2001). 
 
In a similar way, our results on political power draw attention to perceived political threat. 
Instrumentalist political theories like those espoused by Basu (1995), Engineer (1984), Joshi 
(1999) and Sunder Raj, Thambusamy and Samuel (2000), which contend that Hindu nationalist 
parties intentionally provoke (or at least condone) anti-minority violence for what they believe 
will be their political advantage, receive some support from our discovery that states that 
experience violence have more Lok Sabha seats occupied by the NDA. However, our analyses 
also indicate that violence is more likely to occur in states where voting for political parties 
approaches parity. These discoveries echo those of Wilkinson (2004), who found the same for 
Hindu–Muslim violence. So while the association is not particularly robust, the data, on the 
whole, highlight both the perceived political threat perspective and instrumentalist political 
theories. 
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Whether the instrumentalization of anti-Christian violence actually works, as Brass (2003) has 
suggested, is another question altogether. One of the most intriguing results of our analysis was 
that the NDA was far more likely to lose Lok Sabha seats in the 2009 elections in states where 
there had been anti-Christian violence in 2007–8, and that all of the states where the NDA had 
lost ten or more seats had experienced violence in that period. We discern two possible 
explanations for this result. The first is that violence against Christians actually works against 
the very parties that are perceived to provoke or condone it, that is, that anti-Christian violence 
incites an anti-nationalist backlash. The second is that NDA politicians, and their supporters, are 
more likely to provoke or condone violence when they perceive their political support to be in 
decline. Only further research could explain with more confidence whether violence or declining 
NDA political power is the more influential factor. 
 
Finally, our data provide some support for human capital hypotheses, especially those that 
emphasize perceived economic threats. Although Christian literacy rates are unrelated to anti-
Christian violence, Hindu literacy rates and Hindu work participation rates are negatively related 
to violence. More importantly, and more consistently, the all-India data demonstrate a rather 
strong association of relative work deprivation and violence. As Christians approach or surpass 
Hindus in work participation, the proportion of states experiencing violence increases 
dramatically, and subsequent analyses (not shown) indicated that the association was particularly 
strong in the case of male employment. These results are theoretically and socially important 
because of the Hindu nationalist claim that Christians use education and work opportunities to 
lure Hindus to the Christian fold. Whether they do or do not is beyond the scope of this analysis, 
but the data suggest, at the very least, that economic competition (or – considering the effect of 
Christians approaching parity with Hindus – the perception of competition) is one factor in 
Hindu–Christian violence. 
 
Although they provide less consistent information, it is still worth discussing our results on basic 
demographic and social characteristics of state populations that experience violence. Our sub-
national results for north India complement Urdal's finding that male surpluses (admittedly 
measured in 2001) correlate somewhat positively with political violence, at least when combined 
with youth bulges. But at the national level, our data on Hindu–Christian violence lead us to echo 
Urdal's (2008, p. 605) assertion that ‘demographic variables appear to matter little to the 
production of Hindu–Muslim riots in India ….’ At the national level, the sole demographic 
characteristic related (inversely) to the probability of violence was police presence. These data, 
then, are in line with Horowitz's (1985) hypothesis that absence of social control may contribute 
to an increase in violence, and provide indirect support for the state-weakening theories 
advanced by Horowitz (1985), Kohli (1990), Tilly (2003) and others. These results may also 
encourage future researchers to reassess Wilkinson's general scepticism of state-weakening 
theories as explanations for communal violence. 
 
It is worth noting, for the benefit of future research, several ways in which our data and analyses 
might be refined and improved. First, the data should be further disaggregated, at least to the 
district level, so that one violent city or region cannot taint an entire state's risk profile. In 
addition, it may be useful to utilize state assembly rather than Lok Sabha electoral results. 
Moreover, since India's is a first-past-the-post democracy in which political parties commonly 
win with far less than 50 per cent of the vote, it may be useful to statistically explore whether 
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violence peaks at some percentage lower than 50 per cent rather than to conceive of ‘parity’ as 
proximity to 50 per cent (as we did). Our own preliminary investigation (not shown) suggests 
that that violence does indeed peak when the NDA receives around 35 per cent of the vote in Lok 
Sabha elections. Further analysis would also benefit from a time-series study utilizing available 
data on anti-Christian violence over a longer span of time. Such a study would help minimize the 
effects of relying on decadal census data. Finally, the use of multiple data sets on anti-Christian 
violence would control for potential biases. 
 
There are also a number of potentially fruitful lines of inquiry that we were not able to 
investigate. For example, Varshney's (2002) persuasive thesis on the importance of civic 
engagement in reducing the risk of Hindu–Muslim riots should be tested in the context of 
Hindu–Christian conflict. In addition, much recent research (Lobo 2002; Appadurai 2006; 
Ahmad 2007) asserts a link between globalization and ethnic violence in India. This thesis could 
be tested by developing an index of globalization (the presence of multinationals, foreign direct 
investment, etc.) and testing it for correlations with violence. It would also be worth 
investigating possible spillover effects from neighbouring areas, as Urdal (2008) has done, as 
well as whether earlier incidents of violence increase the probability of future violence, as 
Horowitz (2001) suggests. 
 
In addition to these lines of inquiry, any more thorough analysis of violence against Christians 
must test the regular Hindu nationalist claim that anti-Christian violence is provoked by the 
aggressive evangelizing of Christian missionaries. If this were true, then we would expect to see 
an increase in violence in regions with more (or more aggressive) missionaries. A cursory review 
of our data on violence against Christians suggests, for example, that Pentecostal, Charismatic 
and Independent Evangelical Christians are disproportionately targeted while members of the 
Roman Catholic Church, older European and North American Protestant denominations, the 
Church of North India and the Church of South India are rarely among the list of victims, despite 
constituting around 50 per cent of Indian Christians (Barrett, Kurian and Johnson 2001). These 
latter, more mainstream denominational Christians in India often blame the ostensibly more 
offensive evangelizing methods of Pentecostals, Charismatics and Independent Evangelical 
Christians for anti-Christian violence (Baldauf 2005). Reliable data on the distribution of various 
kinds of Christian denominations, missionaries and missionary organizations is, however, 
unfortunately incredibly difficult to come by, and even more so these days given the fear, on the 
part of Christians, that such data might be used by Hindu nationalists to stoke anxieties about 
Christian growth or to target certain Christian communities. Only with better data could such 
hypotheses be tested. 
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1. We follow Varshney (2002) in using ‘ethnic’ in a broader sense; one that includes within the 
term any ascriptive grouping (linguistic, religious, tribal, caste, racial, etc.). 
2. Given the chronological distance of our census data (2001) from our data on attacks against 
Christians (2007–8), we examine the correlation between percentage of the population aged 
seven to seventeen in 2001 and incidents of violence in 2007–8. 
3. We initially investigated indicators of BJP political power in addition to measures of NDA 
political power. These analyses revealed the same pattern of associations with violence against 
Christians (and they are available upon request to the authors). However, the correlations were 
stronger and more consistently significant when measures were specific to the NDA. 
4. Indian censuses do not directly record data on the numbers or proportions of various castes, so 
the inverse of the SC population becomes the best possible indicator of the size of the middle- 
and upper-caste Hindu population. 
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Table 1. Demographic characteristics of states experiencing at least one incident of violence against 
Christians versus states experiencing no violence
Mean value for states with
violence
Mean value for states with no
violence
(n=23) (n=12)
Households with no assets 37% 32%
Police per 100,000 population 1.78*** 4.47
Population density 759 1,199
Sex ratio 884 938
Youth bulge (age seven to
seventeen in 2001)
25% 25%
Sex ratio of youth bulge 922 942
***p<.001.
Table 2. Demographic characteristics of states experiencing at least one incident of violence against 
Christians versus states experiencing no violence, north region only
Mean value for states with
violence
Mean value for states with no
violence
(n=3) (n = 17)
Households with no assets 26% 31%
Police per 100,000 population 2.17 1.7
Population density 3254 892
Sex ratio 766*** 922
Youth bulge (age seven to
seventeen in 2001)
21%** 26%
Sex ratio of youth bulge 901 911
Table 3. Religious, caste and tribe characteristics of states experiencing at least one incident of 
violence against Christians compared to states experiencing no violence against Christians
Indian states Peninsular states
% in states with
violence
% in states with no
violence
% in states with
violence
% in states with no
violence
(n = 23) (n = 12) (n = 23) (n = 12)
Christian
population
5* 26 3 6
Increase in
Christian
population
34* 70 35 45
Hindu population 76* 52 78 70
Increase in Hindu
population
19 24 20* 35
Scheduled castes 15** 5 16** 6
Scheduled tribes 10*** 47 8* 29
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
Table 4. Electoral votes and political seats garnered by the NDA in states experiencing at least one 
incident of violence against Christians compared to states experiencing no violence against Christians 
(based on the 2004 elections)
Indian states Penisular states
Mean value in
states with violence
Mean value in
states with no
violence
Mean value in
states with violence
Mean value in
states with no
violence
(n=23) (n = 12) (n = 21) (n = 6)
NDA seats 5.78* 0.42 6.24 0.50
NDA share of votes37% 26% 39% 38%
Margin of victory 13%* 25% 12% 11%
 p<.10, *p<.05.
Table 5. Human capital of men in states experiencing at least one incident of violence against 
Christians compared to that in states experiencing no violence against Christians
Indian states Peninsular states
% in states with
violence
% in states with no
violence
% in states with
violence
% in states with no
violence
(n = 23) (n=12) (n=21) (n = 6)
Hindu literacy rate 79 82 79* 86
Christian literacy
rate
83 81 84 89
Hindu work
participation
53*** 63 53*** 64
Christian work
participation
52 54 52* 60
*p<.05, ***p<.001.
Figure 1.  Percentage of states experiencing an incident of violence against Christians by 
differential growth rates in religious groups n for each category is indicated at the centre of the 
bar. 
 
*p ≤.05 compared to Hindus increasing faster. 
 
 
  
Figure 2.  Percentage of states experiencing violence in 2007–8 by the number of NDA seats 
lost in the 2009 election  
 
*p≤.05 compared to ‘no seats lost’. 
 
 
  
Figure 3.  Percentage of states experiencing an incident of violence against Christians by 
Christian men's employment status relative to Hindu men 
 
1 Christian work participation is more than 5 per cent lower than Hindu work participation rate.  
2 Christian work participation is 1–5 per cent lower than Hindu work participation rate.  
3 Christian work participation is equal to or higher than Hindu work participation rate. 
 
* p≤.05 compared to areas where Christians are unemployed. 
 
 
